

**TOP SECRET**

25X1



8 September 1959

Copy No. C 63


25X1

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 7  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. x  
UNCLASSIFIED  
CLASSIFIED TO: TS 2090  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 4/14/80  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 4/14/80 REVIEWER: 1

25X1



25X1

State Dept. review completed

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700070001-2

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700070001-2

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

8 September 1959

### DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

OK Communist China: American officials in Hong Kong speculate that a basic motive of the Communists in the Sino-Indian border and Laotian situations is to reverse setbacks in the past year which were greater than they are willing to accept. Increased Chinese military activity on the Sino-Indian border stems in part from a determination to consolidate Communist control over Tibet--an intention particularly evident in mop-up operations against Khamba rebels north of Assam. Communist activity in the Laotian situation, the officials feel, is an effort to restore losses sustained at the time of Vientiane's expulsion of the Pathet Lao from the government. OK

The officials discount the possibilities that the current tension in Asia is (1) part of a bloc effort to provide Khrushchev with a bargaining lever in his talks with President Eisenhower, (2) a deliberate Chinese move to embarrass the USSR because of China's opposition to an East-West rapprochement, or (3) a Chinese-sponsored external diversion for domestic purposes.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

\*India - Communist China: The Indian Government on 7 September issued a White Paper documenting New Delhi's case against Peiping on various border issues. Nehru also informed Parliament that there had been no further developments on the northeast frontier since 26 August. There are press reports, however, that the people of Ladakh and Sikkim are becoming panicky.

In an apparently conciliatory move toward Nepal, Peiping has invited representatives to Lhasa to discuss continuance of traditional trade. Peiping appears anxious to minimize the seriousness of the frontier situation.

25X1

[redacted] reportedly has been told that tension over Sikkim and Bhutan was an "unfortunate mix-up" and not a prelude to hostilities.

25X1

(The Dalai Lama, who is still seeking a sponsor to raise the Tibetan issue in the United Nations, has indicated that he will go to New York personally to plead his cause if necessary. The Indian Government still opposes raising the Tibetan issue)

8 Sept 59

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1

25X1

in the UN. Indian officials feel it would be "regrettable" if such a debate "forced" the USSR to side openly with the Chinese on this issue.) (Page 1)

25X1

*10*  
\*Indonesia - Communist China: (The Chinese Communist Embassy in Djakarta recently lodged a "strong and forceful" protest against treatment of Chinese nationals in Indonesia, demanding that the Indonesian Government cease putting Chinese out of business, or at least compensate them. This protest followed several hints--including cancellation of a proposed visit by a Chinese Communist good-will delegation--that Peiping resents recent Indonesian restrictions on Chinese businessmen and intends to act as champion of their interests. In reporting the protest to a US official on 3 September, Foreign Minister Subandrio said that the Chinese Embassy had been receiving considerable financial aid from local Chinese businessmen, and that Indonesia would continue to "liquidate interests detrimental to the country." He foresaw no open rupture with Communist China, however, and noted that Peiping has been offering Djakarta arms and economic aid "without questions and terms.")

25X1

25X1

*10*  
Japan: (Ambassador MacArthur reports that Prime Minister Kishi is clearly worried over former Prime Minister Ishibashi's current visit to Communist China--particularly its effect on Japanese policy toward the mainland. Since the visit is primarily to "make headlines," Kishi is virtually certain that Ishibashi, on his return, will make harmful proposals urging closer economic and cultural ties with Peiping. He also fears that Ishibashi, who is in bad health, will be easily manipulated by the Communists.)

25X1  
25X1

25X1

(Page 3)

25X1

8 Sept 59

DAILY BRIEF

iii

25X1

25X1

UAR-USSR: The controlled UAR press and radio have accused Pravda and Moscow radio of a "flagrant intervention" in the internal affairs of the UAR. These charges stem from recent Moscow rebroadcasts of anti-UAR articles in the Iraqi Communist press. Damascus radio threatened to retaliate by republishing Khrushchev's "eloquent and fluent admissions of crimes committed against humanity" during the Stalin regime--apparently a reference to Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th party congress in February 1956. UAR propaganda has also accused the Soviet Union of an attempt to isolate Iraq from the other Arab countries and of encouraging Communist agents in the Arab world. These renewed public recriminations, the first since last March, apparently have been brought about by Communist criticism of the UAR's continuing anti-Communist campaign.

25X1

OK

25X1

25X1

25X1

### III. THE WEST

Belgium: The resignation of Congo Minister van Hemelrijck, which followed the refusal of the cabinet to approve his plan for a

OK

8 Sept 59

DAILY BRIEF

iv

25X1

rapid evolution of self-government in the Belgian Congo, has further weakened the shaky Social Christian - Liberal party coalition of Premier Eyskens. Friction within the coalition over various issues has been growing since its formation in November 1958, and Eyskens adjourned Parliament in early July to avert a coalition crisis. The opposition Socialist party, which favors a more liberal Congo policy, is trying to exploit the resignation and may decide to push for new parliamentary elections. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

#### LATE ITEMS

25X1

8 Sept 59

DAILY BRIEF

v

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700070001-2

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700070001-2



## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

### Sino-Indian Relations

Friction between India and Communist China over border problems was given new emphasis with the Indian Government's issuance on 7 September of a White Paper documenting New Delhi's case against Peiping. The 122-page document includes the texts of a series of Indian protests and Chinese replies on questions of disputed border claims, Tibetan refugee activity, treatment of Indian and Bhutanese nationals in Tibet, and the recent border incursions. In presenting the paper to Parliament, Prime Minister Nehru stated that there had been no further developments on the northeast frontier since 26 August.

(The Indian Government early in September apparently notified the Soviet and Polish ambassadors formally of its serious concern over Chinese border incursions. [redacted] [redacted]

[redacted] the Indian foreign secretary advised the ambassadors that if the incidents were to continue, New Delhi would be forced to reappraise its policy of nonalignment.) [redacted]

Peiping appears anxious to minimize the seriousness of the frontier situation. [redacted] [redacted] reportedly was told on 31 August that publication of any stories concerning India's northeast frontier must await a formal statement from Peiping. [redacted] tension over Sikkim and Bhutan was an "unfortunate mix-up" and a "regrettable error," not a prelude to hostilities against India. There has been no comment on the recent border situation in newspapers on the China mainland. The first extensive comment on the situation from the Communist bloc was a Prague broadcast on 4 September denying Indian charges of Chinese "territorial expansionism" and stating that Premier Chou En-lai views negotiations as the "only means" for solving border questions.

Peiping's current policy toward Nepal seems designed to allay fears in Katmandu raised by China's activities along the border. In [redacted]

a statement on 3 September, Nepalese Prime Minister Koirala asserted that the Chinese have released nine Nepalese arrested in Lhasa during the Tibetan revolt and have given assurance they will soon determine the citizenship of mixed Tibetan-Nepalese nationals still under arrest and will consider their release. The Chinese have also shown a willingness to meet with Nepalese officials to facilitate traditional border trade. [REDACTED]

25X1

The Dalai Lama on 7 September issued another public appeal for UN support. His efforts in New Delhi to gain diplomatic assistance apparently have yielded little result. (India continues to oppose raising the Tibetan issue in the UN, primarily because Communist China is not a member and New Delhi feels that no effective action would result. Indian officials also have expressed the view that it would be regrettable if the USSR, whose scant comment on recent Sino-Indian problems indicates to New Delhi disapproval of some Chinese actions, were forced to side openly with Peiping on this issue in the UN. The Indian foreign secretary told the American chargé on 5 September that Soviet representatives in "various capitals" have been quietly indicating they deplored some recent Chinese moves.) [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Kishi Fears Effects of Former Premier's Visit to Peiping

25X1

[REDACTED] (Japanese Prime Minister Kishi is apprehensive that the current visit of former Prime Minister Tanzan Ishibashi to Communist China will adversely affect Tokyo's present policy of firmness toward Peiping. Kishi told Ambassador MacArthur on 2 September that he believed Ishibashi's primary purpose was to "make headlines," and that consequently the former premier would urge closer economic and cultural ties with the mainland on his return to Japan. He also fears that Ishibashi, who is in bad health, will be easily manipulated by the Communists.)

(While Ishibashi has not completely recovered from the stroke which caused him to resign in February 1957, he appears mentally alert, and not even Kishi believes he would urge diplomatic recognition of Peiping. Ishibashi does want to resume a more active role in politics, and, in view of his past advocacy of closer relations with the mainland, he may be sincere in his stated desire to determine personally whether the Chinese Communists really want to cooperate and coexist.)

(Kishi is largely concerned about the effect Ishibashi's trip will have on Japanese public opinion, which has long-favored closer relations with mainland China. Should this subject again become a popular political issue, Kishi may consider it inexpedient to resist the trend.)

(The Chinese Communists, who have concentrated their attacks on Kishi, assured a recent Japanese visitor that in the event government party leaders visited the mainland to discuss the deadlock in relations, the Chinese would not make them "lose face." The Chinese may, as a gesture of accommodation, hint at a limited relaxation of the trade embargo in an effort to create the impression that Kishi's hostility is the only bar to improved relations.) [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700070001-2

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700070001-2

### III. THE WEST

#### Belgian Government Weakened by Dispute Over Congo Policy

The resignation on 3 September of Congo Minister Maurice van Hemelrijck, which followed the refusal of the Belgian cabinet to approve his plan for the rapid "Africanization" of the Congo administration, has further weakened the shaky Social Christian - Liberal coalition of Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens. Powerful financial circles in Brussels which support the Liberal party have opposed Van Hemelrijck's plan since its announcement on 13 January, and the influence of the Palace, exerted chiefly through former King Leopold, has also been thrown against it. Earlier, the Palace had blocked the appointment of a new governor general of the Congo and forced the retention of Governor General Cornelis, who is not in sympathy with Van Hemelrijck's program.

Friction within the Socialist Christian - Liberal coalition has been growing since its formation last November. Serious differences developed over local issues such as electoral reform and the relaxation of restrictions on World War II collaborators. A crisis was avoided in early July by adjourning Parliament with the government's program only partially enacted. It was hoped to reconcile interparty differences before Parliament reconvened in November, but this has proved impossible.

Eyskens has replaced Van Hemelrijck with August de Schrijver, an elder statesman of the Social Christian party who has generally backed Van Hemelrijck's Congo policy and is widely respected--even by the opposition Socialist party, which criticizes the Congo program as not going far enough in the way of economic and social reforms. The Socialists now are trying to exploit the resignation by demanding that Parliament be reconvened to discuss Congo policy, and there is press speculation that they may combine with Social Christian supporters of Van Hemelrijck to form a new coalition government. The Socialist party congress starting 18 September will probably decide whether to attempt this course or to press for early parliamentary elections. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700070001-2

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700070001-2

**THE PRESIDENT**

**The Vice President**

**Executive Offices of the White House**

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs  
Scientific Adviser to the President  
Director of the Budget  
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization  
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration  
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination  
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities  
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy  
Executive Secretary, National Security Council

**The Treasury Department**

The Secretary of the Treasury

**The Department of State**

The Secretary of State  
The Under Secretary of State  
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs  
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs  
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration  
The Counselor  
Director, International Cooperation Administration  
The Director of Intelligence and Research

**The Department of Defense**

The Secretary of Defense  
The Deputy Secretary of Defense  
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs  
The Secretary of the Army  
The Secretary of the Navy  
The Secretary of the Air Force  
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Commandant, United States Marine Corps  
The Director, The Joint Staff  
Chief of Staff, United States Army  
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy  
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force  
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations  
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff  
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army  
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy  
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force  
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe  
Commander in Chief, Pacific

**The Department of Commerce**

The Secretary of Commerce

**Federal Bureau of Investigation**

The Director

**Atomic Energy Commission**

The Chairman

**National Security Agency**

The Director

**National Intelligence Center**

The Director

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700070001-2

**TOP SECRET**

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700070001-2

**TOP SECRET**